AMANPOUR: I want to ask you about Osama bin Laden. You say in your book that you made several efforts to kill him. In retrospect do you believe, though, that you should have mustered some kind of special mission, some kind of special forces mission, even though many of your senior military advisers opposed that at the time. Do you think you should have done it?
CLINTON: Well what I wish now is that I had had a more vigorous military debate. One of the discussions that I had with the 9/11 commission involved the reorganization of the military in the 1980s under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which has done a lot of good. It's helped to rationalize military spending, it's helped us to downside the military and spend more on areas where we needed. It's done a lot of good.
But essentially it's made the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a much more powerful and centralized authority there. So when people began to second-guess the fact that I didn't send the special forces into Afghanistan even though concededly nobody knew where bin Laden was, nobody knew where [Ayman] al-Zawahiri was, nobody knew, but we had a general idea of where they were operating.
After 9/11, when people began to second-guess that, I wish that I had had a military debate because basically the Pentagon and [the Joint Chiefs chairman] were strongly opposed to it, they thought that the chances of those guys getting killed were high. And that's what they signed on to do, to risk their lives, but they didn't want to get killed with no reasonable prospect of accomplishing the mission.
So their view was: We don't know where these people are, we have no reasonable intelligence, we know we can't trust people on the ground because they told us bin Laden was gonna be at this training camp we hit.
We contracted with all these Afghan tribals and its borne no result for us. So we think it's very high risk for a very, very low chance of return, and we recommend against it.
But I'm the commander-in-chief, or I was then, and they would have gone if I had ordered them to. I wish I had debated it a little more thoroughly because if you look at it, the record will reflect that I took every other alternative that I had based on the available intelligence.
We did, it is true, consider bombing three other sites, three other times, but in each case the CIA before the mission could be completed said we just don't have that much confidence in our intelligence.
So you know, when something like 9/11 happens you think, "Well gosh, I wish I had done everything."
Now the other issue which I have been asked about is slightly different, which is after the USS Cole [was bombed in Yemen] in October [2000], do I wish I had ordered the special forces, and the answer to that is, I would have done it in a heartbeat to special forces and more with or without international support, once I got the CIA and the FBI to agree and make an official finding that bin Laden was responsible.
I just assumed he was from the day it happened, and everyone else did. But it was not until after I left office that the FBI and the CIA made a finding. If they had given me a finding beforehand I would have gone after him without regard to the politics, the timing, the election, the court cases, anything going on in America. I would have done it, but I didn't get the confirmation, and America didn't get it until after I left office.
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